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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VALGARDSON HOUSING SYSTEMS,
INC.
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 920644-CA

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Priority No. 15

Respondent.
oooOooo
REPLY BRIEF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Statutes and rules which are determinative were set forth in
Petitioner's original brief and in the brief of Respondent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The correct standard of review is correction of error as the
Utah State Tax Commission has not been granted discretion to
interpret the applicable law to its own liking.
If the transactions in dispute here are wholesale sales of
personal property, or building materials, to a dealer, who is the
actual contractor, no tax is due at all from Petitioner, as it is
a tax exempt transaction.

In that case, the State Tax Commission

should be seeking its tax from the dealer, not from Petitioner.
1

Public policy, the weight of authority, and the Commission's
own rules, are in favor of Respondent's position that a sales tax
in the disputed transactions is due only on the value of the
materials used in construction of the housing unit.
POINT I
PETITIONER SET FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
THIS MATTER IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF.
Petitioner in this action, in its original brief on appeal,
referred

to

the

Standard

of Review

set

forth by

the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act. Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A. states as
follows:
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law; . . . .
Respondent attempts to tilt the playing field in its direction
by suggesting an alternative standard of review that would allow
this Court to grant relief to the Petitioner only in the case of an
abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute. In support
of that alternative theory, Respondent cites the case of Morton
International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Respondent, in doing so, has
asked this Court to misread and misapply that Utah Supreme Court
case.

The Utah Supreme Court, n reviewing the Administrative
2

Procedure Act and the Standard of Review under the Act, stated:
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory construction,
the Utah Administrative Procedure Act does not change the
Standard of Review when the court is in as good a
position as the agency to determine the issue or when the
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting the
statute. However, nothing in the language of section 6346b-16 or its legislative history suggests that an
agency's decision is entitled to deference solely on the
basis of agency expertise or experience. Indeed, there
is no reference to agency expertise or experience in the
statute or the statute's legislative history. Rather, in
granting judicial relief when an "agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law," the language of section
63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a grant of
discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in
reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a
statutory term. 814 P.2d at 588
The Utah Supreme Court, in further referring to the Standard
of Review in cases such as the present one, stated as follows:
However, it is clear from the wording of section 63-46b16 that an agency's statutory construction should only be
given deference when there is a grant of discretion to
the agency concerning the language in question, either
expressly made in the statute or implied from the
statutory language.
The question presented is one of statutory construction
or application, and absent a grant of discretion, the
Commission's decision will be reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard. The statutory terms in
question are of a specific nature and do not connote a
general grant of discretion.
It is apparent that the Commission has not been granted
any discretion in regard to the present issue.
Therefore, its interpretation will not be granted
deference. 814 P.2d at 589.
As in the Morton case, the Utah State Tax Commission is
granted no discretion in interpreting the statutes at issue here.
3

Those statutes, § 59-12-102 and 103 set forth the basis of levying
a sales tax on certain transactions, and then define in detail the
terms used in the statute. No grant of discretion is made, either
explicit or implied, to interpret the statute on its own without
assistance from the courts of this state.

Regarding the legal

issues involved in this action, the "correction-of-error" standard
should be applied.

The Utah State Tax Commission has erroneously

interpreted the statutes at issue here, and its decision should be
reversed.
The Supreme Court, in its analysis of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the standard of review, referred to cases decided
before the adoption of the Act. In doing so, the Court referred to
instances where some deference had been granted to the decision of
the agency:
. . . when the agency#s experience or expertise puts the
agency in a better position to resolve issues concerning
the application of findings of fact to the legal rules
governing the case and the interpretations of the
operative positions of the statutes the agency is
empowered to administer. 814 P.2d at 586.
As referred to above, there is no language in the new Act
which suggests such a continued deference.

Additionally, public

policy militates against giving such deference (or looking for a
reason to find an implied grant of discretion) in a case such as
this one. Most government agencies subject to review in this Court
regulate certain specified activities. Most such agencies have no
4

particular reason to favor one point of view over the other, and to
"skew" a statute in favor of one party.

The Utah State Tax

Commission, of course, is in a unique position.

The reason for

establishing the Utah State Tax Commission is to collect revenue.
The bias of the Commission is inherent. Any ruling made in behalf
of a taxpayer cuts down on the ability of the Commission to raise
revenue.

Any decision by an administrative law judge, which is

subject to approval by the Utah State Tax Commission, pits the
Commission itself against the taxpayer. The function of the court
in such an instance is to level the.playing field and make sure
that the State Tax Commission does not confuse its revenue-raising
function with its regulatory function.

One function requires the

State Tax Commission to be fair, while the very reason of the
Commission's existence militates against such fairness. Granting
deference to the Commission, as it has suggested, is an extremely
poor public policy decision. A revenue-raising agency can only be
kept on a balanced and fair course by a vigorous review of its
decisions by the courts.
Respondent has also cited a recent case from this court,
Putvin v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 920329CA, slip op. (Utah
App. September 1, 1992) for the proposition that Respondent has
considerable discretion in interpreting certain parts of the Tax
Code. That case can be readily distinguished from the present one.
5

The court there found that certain terms had not been defined by
the legislature, and that there was an absence of discernable
legislative history regarding those terms.

The court also found

that the Commission had previously defined the terms itself in
detailed rules which it was following in the Putvin action.

In

this action, the terms at issue have been carefully defined by the
legislature.

Additionally,

there

have

been

no

additional

definitions in the rules promulgated by the Tax Commission, which
assist the Commission in making the determination it has made. In
fact, the Commission has violated its own rules and attempted to
stretch and distort the normal reading of statutes to fit its own
special interests. This is not what the Utah Supreme Court had in
mind in its decision in the Morton case, and it is, not what this
Court had in mind in applying that case in Putvin.
POINT II
THE TYPE OF SALE RESPONDENT ARGUES IN ITS BRIEF IS NOT A
RETAIL SALE AS DEFINED BY THE CODE, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
SALES TAX AT ALL.
Discussion in front of the Utah State Tax Commission focused
on whether or not a sale of property by Petitioner was the sale of
personal property or of real property. Petitioner claimed that it
was the sale of real property, because the items which were sold,
while still on the crane, were finished housing units which were
converted into real property immediately upon the crane depositing
6

those housing units on prepared foundation. Testimony was that the
housing units were attached to the crane with steel bands, which
bands were snipped off immediately upon depositing the home.
Without the bands, the house could not be moved. Within an hour or
two thereafter, the house was nailed to the foundation, and became
totally permanent.
The discussion did not deal with, in any depth, the question
of the nature of the sale from Valgardson to the dealer, and from
the dealer to the ultimate consumer, the owner of the property.
The ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission did refer to a
"sale" of the personal property by Valgardson to the dealer. It is
only, however, in the brief of the Respondent, that the "sale and
resale" transaction takes on significance. Respondent now makes it
clear that the tax commission considers there to be two separate
sales.

On page 13 of Respondent#s brief, it states:

Valgardson sells its modular units to dealers who are
responsible for linking the units together and affixing
the units to a foundation. The dealers then sell the
completed home to purchasers.
By emphasizing that there are, in fact, two sales in a very
short period of time, Respondent has changed the whole complexion
of this case.

The argument in front of the Utah State Tax

Commission primarily concerned whether the sale was of tangible
personal property as defined by § 59-12-102(13)(a) U.C.A. or
whether it is a sale of an interest in real estate, which is not
7

taxable, pursuant to § 59-12-102(13)(b)(i) U.C.A. The argument now
shifts to whether or not this was a retail sale as defined by § 5912-102(8) and (9) U.C.A.

A retail sale is defined by those

sections as a sale which is "not for resale."
Petitioner acknowledges Rule R865-19-58S of the Administrative
Rules of the Utah State Tax Commission which states, in part:
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
That rule, however, goes on to state:
1.
The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property
since he is the last one to own it as personal property.
Ordinarily, that would mean that the sale from Petitioner to
the dealer of tangible personal property would be a taxable
transaction,

and # that

Valgardson

would

be

responsible

for

collection and payment of a full sales tax if the transaction is
deemed to have been a sale of tangible personal property.

In

actual practice, however, a real estate contractor purchases
building materials in a tax exempt transaction, in bulk.

It is

only when he sells the finished product, as part of real estate,
that he determines the amount of materials actually used in that
housing unit and is responsible for remitting the tax on the
building materials used in that unit.

(See Stipulated Facts Nos.

23, 24 and 25, and Additional Stipulated Facts Nos. 1 and 2, both
8

of which are attached Petitioner's original brief).

In other

words, if the disputed transactions are a sale of improvements on
real property, it is Respondent's duty to collect and pay the tax
on the building supplies consumed in that housing unit, upon sale
of the unit.

If the sale is of tangible personal property

(building materials) to a dealer who is a real estate contractor,
it is a tax exempt transaction, and the determination and payment
of the tax owed is up to the dealer.

In that case, Petitioner has

vastly overpaid taxes to the State Tax Commission and this Petition
for redetermination should not only be upheld, but a substantial
refund should be ordered.

The State Tax Commission, in its mad

rush to collect as much tax as possible, has changed the nature of
the transaction and "shot itself in the foot". The Tax Commission
simply cannot have it both ways.

If Petitioner is a real estate

contractor, as he claims, he pays taxes on 50% of the sale (the
value of materials in the completed housing unit as set forth in
stipulated facts No. 23 - 25). If Petitioner is determined to be
a wholesaler of housing materials, the State Tax Commission is
simply talking to the wrong person. This is an exempt transaction
and the sales tax should be collected from the dealer.

9

POINT III
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO REASONABLY APPLY WHAT DISCRETION
IT HAS, AND HAS VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES.
Respondent has, in its brief, cited some dubious authority for
its position in this action. Several of the so-called citations of
authority are "private letters".
they say:

private.

Those letters are exactly what

They are in the form of letters to a

particular person giving an informal opinion as to what tax
ramifications certain transactions might have in other states. The
letters are complete with blank spaces or asterisks where the names
of private individuals seeking legal advice were once inserted.
Respondent does not doubt that, given a particular situation, a
staff attorney for a tax commission in Illinois or Massachusetts
might offer some valid advice.

If counsel for the State Tax

Commission in this action were asked for his private opinion, he
would obviously state that the transactions at issue here are
taxable at 100% of the value of the sale. He would be entitled to
his private opinion; but he would be wrong. His opinion would have
absolutely no authority in a court of law in this state, and
obviously would have none in an appellate tribunal of another
state.

If the legislature had determined that a staff attorney

working for the Utah State Tax Commission could determine on his
own what taxes should be paid, it would not have granted Petitioner
the right to bring this case to the court system.
10

Additionally, some of the authorities cited by Respondent are
in Petitioner's favor.

A case in point is the ruling of the

Virginia Department of Taxation included in Respondent's materials.
In fact, a careful reading of the Virginia ruling is that the
modular builder in that action is deemed to be a real estate
contractor and is required to pay sales tax on the value of the
materials used to construct the building.

That is exactly what

Petitioner has offered to do, and is the correct position to take.
Respondent has cited the Iowa Supreme Court case of Sturtz v.
Iowa Department of Revenue, 373 N.W.2d at 134 (Iowa 1985).

Once

again, this case substantiates the position of Petitioner.

The

actual dispute was over whether a sales tax or a use tax should be
levied on a sale of a modular home built in Wisconsin and sold in
Iowa.

Harold Sturtz was not the manufacturer of the housing, but

was the equivalent of the "dealer" in the transactions at issue
here.

It is obviously interesting to note that Pittsville Homes,

Inc., the manufacturer of the homes, was not a party to the action.
The Iowa Supreme Court first reviewed the reason for setting up the
sales tax law as it had been enacted:
A special rule, however, applies to sales of building
materials to 'contractors' ,— which the director, on
substantial evidence, found that Sturtz was. . . . The
reason for this rule is that contractors turn building
materials into real estate, and problems may arise as to
whether the ultimate customer would be liable for sales
tax. . . . Indeed the Department does not argue that the
Sturtz - customer sales are subject to sales tax. 373
11

N.W.2d at 134.
As set forth by the Iowa Supreme Court, the reason for taxing
transactions in the way they are taxed is simple.

Building

materials are to be taxed on their value before being put into the
finished home. Because the actual sale of a finished home is not
subject to sales tax, the value of the materials used in producing
that home are taxed.

While it is theoretically the sale of the

building materials to the contractor that is taxed, it is actually
the contractor who determines the amount of, and pays, that tax.
Once again, that has been the Petitioner's position all along.
Respondent has cited the Georgia Supreme Court case of Adrian
Housing Corporations v. Collins. 319 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. 1984). While
that case does appear to support Respondent's position herein, it
can certainly be distinguished.

The Georgia Supreme Court, over

the dissent of two justices, found a taxable transaction between
two separate corporations owned by the same principals, when a
manufacturer of modular homes sold the homes to the second company
for delivery. The Georgia Supreme Court found that at the time of
sale, "the modules are half units on Gillis' flatbed trailers
waiting to be moved to a purchaser's lot by Gillis, and are
properly considered tangible personal property."
855.

319 S.E.2d at

In the instant case, Petitioner delivers the units to the

lot, puts them on the crane, and actually begins the process of
12

affixing the homes to the property.

Thus, Petitioner in this

instance is much closer to the actual real estate construction than
was Adrian.

The opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court is poor

public policy, and it should not be followed.
Respondent, in its very weak survey of other state decisions,
has failed to >cite the case of Wisconsin Department of Revenue v.
Sterling Custom Homes Corporation, 283 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1979). In
that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did see the nature of the
transaction.

In a well-reasoned opinion, the court stated:

In reaching our conclusion that Sterling Homes was a
contractor and a consumer of the goods, we look to the
general scope of its activities in its home-construction
enterprise. 283 N.W.2d at 574.
The facts of the Wisconsin case were almost identical to the
present facts:
When the foundation was completed and the builder was
ready to erect the house, the taxpayer loaded the
components in the sequence that conformed to the order
that the components would be used at the job site. The
components
were delivered to the job site by the tax
payer/s trucks and drivers. At the job site, the larger
components were unloaded by crane. The crane operators
were hired by the builder, but were usually selected by
one of the tax payers sales man. . . . Although the
drivers' only defined on-site responsibility was to keep
a report and respect to the erection, they often helped
or supervised, because they were very familiar with the
process. 283 N.W.2d at 574-5.
The court went on to say:
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The taxability of the transaction transferring the
components to the builder is dependent on whether
Sterling Homes was engaged in "real property construction
activities." If Sterling Homes was engaged in such an
activity, than it is a contractor or a subcontractor and
is a consumer of the tangible personal property used in
real property construction activities and the sales tax
applies to transfers to Sterling Homes and not by it.
The facts demonstrate that, in all respects but one, the
taxpayer was engaged in • real property construction
activities. The lone exception is that Sterling Homes
conducted its construction activities at a factory,
rather than at the building site. The tax payer used the
materials it purchased for only a single purpose — to
construct custom-designed homes to be assembled at
predetermined locations on foundations which were
specifically designed for the prefabricated components.
The components thus assembled were consumed by the very
process of fabrication, for which they would be useless
in their fabricated form except for the very building for
which designed.
The distinction between on-site and off-site construction
of the components is not a criterion upon which the
legislature has hinged the question of taxability.
Rather, taxability is to be determined by whether or not
the tax payer is engaged in 'real property construction
activities.' The record leaves no doubt that Sterling
Homes was so engaged. 283 N.W.2d at 575.
It appears that the Utah Supreme Court has adopted similar
reasoning to that of the Wisconsin Court, in the very recent case
of Chicago Bridge v. State Tax Commission. 196 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah 1992).

The court stated:

In effect, a real property contractor is treated as a
consumer for sales tax purposes.
The reason for this rule is that materials which are
purchased and then converted into real property would
escape the sales tax because a sales tax is not imposed
on the sale of real property. Real property contractors
14
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Valgardson Housing Systems, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commissionf Case No. 920644-CA

Dear Mrs. Noonan:
This letter is being written pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On page 17 of Respondent's
Brief is a citation to an unpublished opinion of the State of New
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position.
The entire opinion of the Tax Appeals Tribunal is
included in an addendum to Respondent's Brief.
Please be advised that this decision was annulled by the New
York Supreme Court — Appellate Division on November 25, 1992.
This will be a published opinion, but since it is not yet
published, I am enclosing a copy of the opinion of the Appellate
Division with this letter.
Thank you for your consideration.
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OPINION AND JUDGMENT

STATE OF NEW YORK TAX
APPEALS TRIBUNAL et al.,
Respondents.

Calendar Date:
Before:

October 13, 1992

Mikoll, J.P., Crew III, Mahoney, Casey and Harvey, JJ.

Blinkoff, Viksjo, Robinson & Saeli (Joseph F. Saeli Jr. of
counsel), Buffalo, for petitioners.
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Daniel Smirlock of counsel),
Albany, for Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of
New York, respondent.

Casey, J.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this
court pursuant to Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of
respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal which sustained a sales and use tax
assessment imposed under Tax Law articles 28 and 29.
Petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing Inc. (hereinafter
petitioner) is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business
of manufacturing modular homes. During the relevant audit period,
85 modular homes manufactured by petitioner were sold in New York.
Based upon an audit of petitioner's invoices for the 85 sales, the
State Department of Taxation and Finance concluded that 23 sales
for which a "roll-on" or installation charge was included on the
invoice were exempt from sales tax under Tax Law S 1115 (a) (17),
but were subject to use tax under Tax Law § 1110. The remaining 62
sales for which no "roll-on" charge was shown on the invoice were
determined to be subject to sales tax. Notices of deficiency were
issued and petitioner initiated the administrative appeal process.
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At the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
ALJ), the Department conceded that, pursuant to Matter of Morton
Bldgs. v £hu (126 AD2d 828, affd on mem below 70 NY2d 725),
petitioner owed no use tax. After hearing the testimony of the
sales tax auditor who conducted the field audit and petitioner's
president, the ALJ sustained the determination that 62 of the 85
sales were subject to sales tax. Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal
(hereinafter respondent) sustained the ALJ's determination,
resulting in this proceeding to review respondent's determination.
Tax Law & 1115 (a) (17) provides an exemption from sales tax
for fl[t]angible personal property sold by a contractor,
subcontractor or repairman to a person * * * for whom he is adding
to, or improving real property, property or land by capital
improvement, or for whom he is about to do the foregoing, if such
personal property is to become an integral part of such structure,
building or real property". It is undisputed that in each of the
sales, the modular home manufactured by petitioner was permanently
installed on the customer's land and constituted a capital
improvement (see. Tax Law former S 1101 [b] [9]). The critical
issue in dispute at the administrative proceeding was whether
petitioner not only sold the tangible personal property, but also
installed it on the customer's land. According to respondent's
interpretation of Tax Law S 1115 (a) (17), petitioner's sales are
exempt if petitioner installed the modular homes, but the sales are
taxable if petitioner did not install the modular homes. We see
nothing irrational in this interpretation, which accords plain
meaning to the statutory language.
On the issue of whether petitioner was the installer as well
as the seller of the modular homes, respondent made the following
relevant findings. Petitioner sold its modular homes through
dealers or realtors who would accompany the customer to the
customer's site to determine whether a modular home could be
installed on the site. Petitioner would then custom build a
modular home using the customer's design. The sections of the home
were shipped to the customer's site, with petitioner making all of
the arrangements for shipping. Upon arrival at the site, the
sections were unloaded from the truck, assembled and permanently
installed on a foundation. The "roll-on" crew which performed the
installation work was W.D. Construction, and in every instance
petitioner contacted W.D. Construction to arrange and schedule
installation.
A "roll-on" charge was listed on the customer invoice in
instances where the installer had inspected the site and advised
petitioner what the charge would be. When the installer had not
inspected the site or there were conditions at the site which might
require extra work, no "roll-on" charge was listed on the invoice.
Because the invoice accompanied the home to the site, W. D.
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Construction sent its bill for installation services to the dealer
when no "roll-on" charge was listed on the invoice. Petitioner
maintained insurance on each home until it was permanently
installed on its foundation, at which point title passed from
petitioner to the customer.
Respondent concluded that in the absence of a
contractor-subcontractor relationship between petitioner and the
installer (W. D. Construction), petitioner did not both sell and
install the modular home and, therefore, was not entitled to the
exemption. In so doing, respondent rejected the testimony of
petitioner's president that W. D. Construction was its
subcontractor because of the absence of supporting documentation.
The determination must be annulled as irrational and lacking in
evidentiary support in the record.
Respondent's determination that no contractor-subcontractor
relationship existed between petitioner and W. D. Construction is
in direct conflict with the Department's conclusion that 23 of
petitioner's sales were exempt under Tax Law § 1115 (a) (17).
Inasmuch as W. D. Construction was the installer in each of those
sales, it is clear that there was in fact a
contractor-subcontractor relationship between petitioner and W. D.
Construction for at least 23 sales and, therefore, we are of the
view that respondent's finding of no contractor-subcontractor
relationship in the 61 disputed sales cannot stand in the absence
of evidentiary support in the record establishing a rational basis
for the disparate treatment of the sales.
The Department relied exclusively upon the presence or absence
of a "roll-on" charge on the invoice to determine whether a sale
was exempt or taxable. Respondent agreed and also noted that for
the 61 disputed sales petitioner was not billed for the
installations and did not pay for them. Thes<* facts do not justify
the disparate treatment accorded to petitioner's sales. The
relationship between and among petitioner, W. D. Construction, the
dealer and the customer was the same for all the sales: the dealer
acted as petitioner's agent in effecting the sale to the customer
and W. D. Construction installed the modular homes at petitioner's
request. Regardless of whether a "roll-on" charge was listed on
the invoice, installation of the modular home was an integral part
of each sale, which was not completed by the passing of title to
the customer until the home was installed. Neither the customer
nor the dealer played any role in the installation of the modular
homes. Petitioner arranged and scheduled the installation with W.
D. Construction, and petitioner controlled the manner in which W.
D. Construction installed the homes. When asked about petitioner's
control over W. D. Construction's work, petitioner's president
explained:
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Well, there are certain things that are
unique to every different manufacturer's
home. And we have instructed him on how we
want the house set and erected, how the roof
goes. He's aware of all these things that
are unique to our house. * * *
The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that the
relationship among the relevant parties, including petitioner and
W. D. Construction, was the same, regardless of whether a "roll-on"
charge was listed on the invoice. The mere fact that W. D.
Construction sent its bill to the dealer instead of petitioner does
not alter the relationship. The invoices in the record are
addressed to the dealer. Thus, regardless of whether the
installation fee is included in the invoice or billed directly by
W. D. Construction, the dealer receives the bill for installation.
It is apparent that in most cases both the shipping fee and
installation fee, along with various options and extras selected by
the customer, are separately stated items included in the total
price paid by the customer, regardless of whether the installation
fee is included as a "roll-on" charge on the invoice addressed to
the dealer or is billed directly to the dealer by W. D.
Construction.
The irrationality of determining petitioner's eligibility for
an exemption based upon the presence or absence of a "roll-on"
charge on the invoice for a particular sale is confirmed by the
record. During the hearing, petitioner conceded that three of its
sales of modular homes in New York during the audit period were
sales of tangible personal property. All three sales were to a
dealer in the Town of Cairo, Greene County, where the modular homes
apparently were temporarily assembled as displays. Two of those
sales, however, were included in the 23 sales which the Department
had ruled exempt from sales tax (and later conceded were not
subject to use tax) because a "roll-on" charge was listed on the
invoices. As a result of the taxing authority's reliance upon the
presence or absence of a "roll-on" charge to determine whether a
sale was exempt, clearly a matter of form over substance, two sales
which concededly should not have been exempt were exempted.
In conclusion, we note that this is not a case where
respondent's determination rests on an assessment of the
credibility of the testimony of petitioner's president that W. D.
Construction was petitioner's subcontractor for the installation of
modular homes in New York. Rather, the issue is whether the
evidence in the record provides a rational basis for respondent's
determination that although some of petitioner's sales in New York
were exempt from sales tax, others were not exempt. In the absence
of any evidence in the record that petitioner's relationship with
W. D. Construction differed from sale to sale, there is no basis
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for according different tax treatment to those sales. The
determination must, therefore, be annulled.
Mikoll, J.P., Crew III, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur,

ADJUDGED that the determination is annulled, with costs, and
petition granted.

ENTER:

Michael J. Novack
Clerk

are therefore considered the consumers because their
purchases of materials that are incorporated into real
property are the last transactions in which those
materials can be subjected to the sales tax.
The test for determining whether a person is a real
property contractor is based not only on who converts
tangible personal property into real property, but also
on the nature of the transaction. 196 Adv. Rep. at 20.
The

Supreme

Court

went

on

to

cite

the

earlier

case

of

Nickerson Pump and Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d
520 (Utah 1961) in which a manufacturer and installer of pumps on
real property was determined not to be a real property contractor
because the pumps were removable and were to be used at different
locations.

The court there found that the primary agreement was

for the assembling
specific
contract.

place,

of the pumps, and that

which

was

temporary,

was

installation
incidental

Obviously, none of those items are present

instant case.

This transaction

to

in a
the

in the

is for the installation of a

permanent housing unit, and, to reiterate the position of the Utah
Supreme Court:
The test for determining whether a person is a real
property contractor is based not only on who converts
tangible personal property into real property but also on
the nature of the transaction, id.
The Chicago Bridge case went on to determine that the large
tanks manufactured by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company in Utah
were for permanent installation, and therefore made the Chicago
Bridge and Iron Company a real property contractor even though the
15

*materials were not installed in the State of Utah.

It is

interesting to note that the Utah State Tax Commission took exactly
the opposite position in that case that it takes here. Once again,
the State Tax Commission cannot have things both ways. Petitioner
is a real property contractor and should be taxed as one.
Rather than looking at technicalities, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court looked at the totality of the transaction.

It saw the

transaction for what it was, the construction of an improvement to
real property. This appears to be the position of the Utah Supreme
Court, as well. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the
transaction as a whole, and it is the reasoning of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that should be upheld.

It is just that reasoning

that is apparent in Rule R 865-19-58S.A.3 which was cited in
Petitioner's original brief, and which specifically states that
"the sale of a completed home or building is not subject to the
tax, . . . ." The Utah State Tax Commission should be required to
live up to the spirit and the clear meaning of its own rule.
Petitioner once again directs the attention of the court to
the Administrative Rules of Colorado and California (made part of
the Addendum in Petitioner's main brief) which specifically tax
sales of modular homes on the value of the materials in those
modular homes, and set forth formulae very similar to the 50%
formula set forth in the stipulated facts of these parties.
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Respondent's contention that their view in this matter is the
majority view is simply not supported by the facts.

In fact,

Respondent has changed its view several times since this action was
commenced.

Counsel for the tax commission has attempted to hold

the transaction up to several different lights to find one that
will support his position. He certainly has succeeded in confusing
the issues.

He has not succeeded in showing any authority or

support for the peculiar meaning which his auditors have read into
a statute which appears to speak for itself.

The position of the

Utah State Tax Commission in this matter not only flies in the face
of the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, it is not a
reasonable position.

It is not a reasonable application of what

discretion has been granted to the State Tax Commission.

Thus,

Petitioner should be granted the redetermination that it seeks, on
the basis of whichever standard of review the Court determines
should be applied.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner should be granted the relief requested in its
/

original brief.
DATED this

k

day of

fl/bi/j-^

lo>~^~~

, 1992.

MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS

W. Andrew McCullough (2170J
Attorney for Petitioner
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i

k^day of tyWjJ^^
l]/iLUW/J^r
C^day

.

1992,

I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Reply
Brief, postage prepaid to Clark Snelson, Attorney for Respondent,
36 South State Street, 11th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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